

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NEW DE 02779 270145Z

70

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 SAM-01 NIC-01 OMB-01 IO-14 ACDA-19

SAJ-01 AID-20 EB-11 TRSE-00 IGA-02 COME-00 DRC-01

/197 W

----- 047191

R 262025Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9925

INFO AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

CINCPAC

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

USLO PEKING

AMCONSUL BOMBAY

AMCONSUL CALCUTTA

AMCONSUL MADRAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 2779

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IN, PK

SUBJ: INDIA-PAKISTAN: THE FIVE YEAR PERSPECTIVE

SUMMARY: PAKISTAN'S RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH IMPROVES THE
SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS. BUT IT DOESN'T
CHANGE THE PROSPECT FOR FIVE YEARS HENCE, WHICH IS FOR LIMITED
DETENTE WITH CONTINUED SUSPICION. WE BELIEVE INDIA DOES WANT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NEW DE 02779 270145Z

GOOD RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, RECOGNIZES THAT FURTHER

DISINTEGRATION OF PAKISTAN WOULD NOT BE IN ITS INTEREST, AND HAS NO INTENTION OF TAKING MILITARY ACTION AGAINST PAKISTAN. BUT IT IS SUSPICIOUS OF BHUTTO'S INTENTIONS TOWARD INDIA, AND THUS OF HIS RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND THE OIL STATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF. INDIA WORRIES ABOUT THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF PAKISTAN IN A SHORT WAR, WHILE CONFIDENT OF ITS BASIC MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER PAKISTAN IN ANY PROLONGED CONFLICT. TRAVEL, COMMUNICATIONS AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS PROBABLY WILL BE RESTORED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, BUT TRADE AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WILL PROVE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. KASHMIR WILL CONTINUE AS A BACKGROUND IRRITANT, AND FORCE REDUCTIONS ARE UNLIKELY. END SUMMARY.

1. INDIAN VIEW OF ITS ROLE: INDIA SAYS IT WANTS TO END CONFRONTATION WITH PAKISTAN. MRS. GANDHI WAS PROUD, AND WE BELIEVE SINCERE, IN EXPLAINING SHE RESISTED PRESSURES TO DESTROY PAKISTAN IN 1971. WE BELIEVE SHE WANTS DETENTE ON THE SUBCONTINENT AND SHE FEELS SHE MADE CONCESSIONS AT SIMLA TO ACHIEVE THIS. SHE ALSO INSISTS--PLAUSIBLY WE THINK--THAT FURTHER DISINTEGRATION OF PAKISTAN WOULD NOT BE IN INDIA'S INTEREST. BUT NOW INDIANS BELIEVE THE BURDEN OF IMPROVING RELATIONS RESTS WITH PAKISTAN WHICH MUST ADJUST TO INDIAN POWER AND INFLUENCE.

2. INDIAN ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN: INDIANS ARE DOUBIOUS THAT PAKISTAN WILL MAKE SUCH AN ADJUSTMENT FOR A LONG TIME. CONFIDENCE IN BHUTTO'S DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS HAS WANED OVER THE PAST YEAR. BUT DIFFERENTLY, THE INDIANS APPEAR TO FEEL THAT PAKISTAN HAS NOT "LEARNED" THE LESSON OF DEFEAT IN 1971 AND ARE FRUSTRATED AT HAVING BEEN PUT ON THE DIPLOMATIC DEFENSIVE AGAIN AND AGAIN BY BHUTTO. THE INDIANS ARE LESS SURE THAT A "DEMOCRATIC" PAKISTAN WILL AUTOMATICALLY GET ALONG BETTER WITH INDIA THAN ONE DOMINATED BY A MILITARY OLIGARCHY. INDIA SEES POST-1971 PAKISTAN AS NOT MUCH MORE SUCCESSFUL THUS FAR THAN PRE-1971 PAKISTAN IN BUILDING A STABLE SENSE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY DIVORCED FROM OPPOSITION TO INDIA, EVEN THOUGH PAKISTAN WITHOUT EAST PAKISTAN IS NOW A MUCH MORE COHESIVE REGION. SOME INDIVIDUAL INDIANS BELIEVE THIS GLOOMY PICTURE MAY CHANGE GRADUALLY IF PAKISTAN CAN GET AWAY FROM ITS "BACK AGAINST THE WALL" ATTITUDE. THEY SEE SIGNS OF WARMING ATTITUDES BY INDIVIDUALS IN PAKISTAN. BUT EVEN THESE INDIANS BELIEVE IT MAY TAKE MANY YEARS FOR THESE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NEW DE 02779 270145Z

SLOW CHANGES TO SPREAD WIDELY AND TO AFFECT INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS.

3. KASHMIR: CONCEIVABLY INDIA AND PAKISTAN COULD REACH A FINAL SETTLEMENT ON THE KASHMIR ISSUE. MUCH MORE LIKELY IS THAT THEY WILL LEAVE IT IN COLD STORAGE. THIS WOULD BE SIMPLIFIED IF BHUTTO INTEGRATED PAKISTANI-HELD KASHMIR INTO PAKISTAN WHILE INDIA REACHED AGREEMENT WITH SHEIKH ABDULLAH. MOST LIKELY,

HOWEVER, KASHMIR WILL CONTINUE TO BE A SPORADIC IRRITANT IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS FIVE OR EVEN TEN YEARS FROM NOW.

4. BANGLADESH: INDIA IS CONCERNED LEST PAKISTANI RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH LEAD TO A REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN BANGLADESH'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS. WITH PAKISTAN AND CHINA BOTH ACTIVE IN DACCA, INDIA'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH BANGLADESH WILL BE SORELY TESTED. INDIA IS RESIGNED TO THIS BUT HOPES BANGLADESH WILL NOT REVERSE ITS ATTITUDES TOWARD INDIA COMPLETELY. DEPENDING ON HOW PAKISTAN GOES ABOUT RENEWING AND BUILDING RELATIONS WITH BANGLADESH, FRESH ABRASIVE ELEMENTS COULD BE INSERTED INTO INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND SUBCONTINENTAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL. NEVERTHELESS, SOME INDIANS ARGUE THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN MAY REFOCUS PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS TOWARD THE SUBCONTINENT AND AWAY FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH IS ALSO IN INDIA'S INTEREST. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR BUILDING A NEW SUBCONTINENTAL "ENTENTE" (WHICH FOREIGN MINISTRY PLANNERS ENLARGE TO INCLUDE SRI LANKA, NEPAL AND POSSIBLY EVEN AFGHANISTAN AT SOME POINT).

5. THE PERCEIVED PAKISTANI THREAT: IN ADDITION TO BEING SUSPICIOUS OF PAKISTANI INTENTIONS, INDIANS STILL CONSIDER THE PAKISTAN ARMY STRONG ENOUGH TO HURT INDIA, AT LEAST IN A SHORT WAR. INDIA VIEWS WITH CONCERN PAKISTANI TIES TO CHINA--STILL SEEN AS THE MAIN THREAT TO INDIA--AND ITS DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONSERVATIVE MUSLIM COUNTRIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF. THE LATTER POSE A PLAUSIBLE THREAT AS POTENTIAL FINANCIAL AND MILITARY BACKERS FOR PAKISTAN DURING A CRISIS AND AS STATES WHICH MIGHT TURN OFF CRITICAL OIL SUPPLIES TO INDIA AT PAKISTAN'S URGING DURING A WAR. IN A LONG WAR, INDIANS ACKNOWLEDGE THEY HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR FROM PAKISTAN BUT INSIST THAT SETBACKS IN THE EARLY STAGES OF ANY CONFLICT WOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NEW DE 02779 270145Z

POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO ANY INDIAN GOVERNMENT. HENCE INDIA MUST HAVE ABSOLUTE MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER PAKISTAN AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME AND PLACE.

6. ARMS LIMITATION: REDUCTION IN ARMS EXPENDITURES AND/OR FORCE LEVELS WOULD RESULT IN MAJOR ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR BOTH COUNTRIES. THE GOI HAS CAREFULLY LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR DISCUSSION OF SUCH REDUCTION AS LONG AS IT DOESN'T MEAN PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS. BUT DISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES MAKES MORE THAN TOKEN REDUCTIONS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. INDIAN FEAR THAT PERSIAN GULF ARMS MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO PAKISTAN COMPLICATES ANY FUTURE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. INDIAN MUSINGS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM ARE EVIDENT IN AMBASSADOR KAUL'S AMBITIOUS SCHEME FOR INDIAN OCEAN REGIONAL COOPERATION (STATE 037015). AT THE SAME TIME

INDIA ARGUES THAT THE CHINESE THREAT FORCES IT TO MAINTAIN A HIGH LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS. INDIANS DO NOT ANTICIPATE NORMALIZATION OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY EASE THIS POTENTIAL THREAT. INDIA DISCOUNTS THE DANGER TO PAKISTAN FROM ITS OTHER NEIGHBOR, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN'S POSITION, WE SUSPECT, IS JUST THE REVERSE. FOR INDIA THE 3 PERCENT OF GNP IT SPENDS ON THE MILITARY IS A CHEAP INSURANCE POLICY AGAINST THE DEFEAT AND CONCOMITANT INTERNAL CRITICISM WHICH OCCURRED IN 1962.

7. EFFECT OF THE DOMESTIC SITUATION: INDIAN RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN ARE PERHAPS THE ONLY FOREIGN POLICY QUESTION WHICH STIRS UP INDIAN PUBLIC OPINION AT ALL LEVELS AND IN NEARLY ALL REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY. A CONFIDENT INDIA CAN DEAL REASONABLY AND EVEN FARSIGHTEDLY WITH PAKISTAN. THERE HAS BEEN SUPPORT FOR THE SIMLA AND DELHI AGREEMENTS FROM ALL PARTIES EXCEPT THE JANA SANGH. WHEN THE POLITICAL/ECONOMIC FABRIC WEAKENS AND FRAYS, HOWEVER, THE ACCOMPANYING RESURGENCE OF HINDU AND MUSLIM COMMUNAL ANIMOSITY CAN SHARPLY CURTAIL THE OPTIONS OPEN TO INDIA VIS-A-VIS PAKISTAN. COMMUNAL TENSION IN INDIA TENDS TO CONFIRM THE WORST PAKISTANI FEARS ABOUT DOMINATION BY "HINDU" INDIA, LEADING TO A STIFFENING IN ISLAMABAD'S ATTITUDE.

8. THE OUTLOOK: ALL OF THIS ARGUES AGAINST REALLY GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. THE MOST WE BELIEVE THAT REASONABLY SHOULD BE HOPED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 NEW DE 02779 270145Z

FOR IS LIMITED DETENTE WITH CONTINUED SUSPICION. TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND TRAVEL LINKS CAN BE RESTORED IF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE NO INSUPERABLE PROBLEM. TRADE IS MORE DIFFICULT BECAUSE (A) HISTORICALLY MOST OF INDIA'S TRADE WAS WITH EAST RATHER THAN WEST PAKISTAN AND (B) EACH COUNTRY WILL BE RELUCTANT TO TIE ITSELF TO SUPPLIES FROM THE OTHER. CULTURAL RELATIONS ARE MOST DIFFICULT, GIVEN PAKISTANI FEAR OF HAVING THEIR CAREFULLY NURTURED CULTURE SWAMPED BY MOVIES, MAGAZINES, POETS, MUSICIANS AND INTELLECTUALS FROM INDIA. PROSPECTS FOR AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCING ARMED FORCES BY BOTH SIDES ARE DIM.

9. NEVERTHELESS, WE SEE NO SIGNS WHATSOEVER THAT INDIA INTENDS OR SEES IT IN ITS INTERESTS TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST PAKISTAN AND, DESPITE THE HISTORY OF PERIODIC OUTBREAKS OF FIGHTING OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS, WE SEE NO REASON WHY THE NEXT FIVE YEARS SHOULD SEE A RENEWAL OF WAR BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

AS A CAVEAT: WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT A WHOLE SERIES OF "WORST" CASES WILL NOT OCCUR: FOR EXAMPLE, THAT PAKISTAN WON'T BEGIN TO DISINTEGRATE, THAT AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WON'T BECOME EMBROILED IN ACTUAL MILITARY CONFLICT, AND THAT ECONOMIC

PROBLEMS AND ACCOMPANYING POLITICAL AGITATION DON'T WEAKEN
INDIA TO THE POINT WHERE IT IS INCAPABLE OF ANY ACTION. OR,
TO PHRASE IT THE OTHER WAY, THAT DOMESTICALLY AND IN THEIR
RELATIONS WITH THEIR OTHER NEIGHBORS INDIA AND PAKISTAN WILL
CONTINUE TO MUDDLE THROUGH.
MOYNIHAN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, POLITICAL STABILITY, POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 FEB 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974NEWDE02779
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: NEW DELHI
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t1974029/aaaaahwh.tel
Line Count: 229
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 JUN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <04 JUN 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <27 DEC 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INDIA-PAKISTAN: THE FIVE YEAR PERSPECTIVE SUMMARY: PAKISTAN'S RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH IMPROVES THE
TAGS: PFOR, IN, PK
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005